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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JENNIFER OTTENS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
NICKOLAS COLEMAN and DAN MCNEIL, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 20090231 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. DIRECTED VERDICT- A. Dan Had a Duty to The Public and Therefore to the 
Plaintiff 
The Defendant erroneously and repeatedly asserted in his brief that: 
"[To] support imposing a duty of due care on Dan . . . or . . . support a finding that 
he acted negligently . . . , " "[Plaintiff] produced no evidence" . . . . that Dan [ 1 ] 
" . . . had undertaken any affirmative ac t . . . to ensure that the load placed in 
Jake's truck was secure,.. . [2] was responsible for loading the chair". . . "or [3] 
that the chair came loose from the vehicle as a result of Dan's actions or 
omissions". . . App'ee Brief p. 7, 8. 
First, Dan was both "directing the move," and "was supervising the loading of his 
possessions," and "personal stuff...," "including his clothing and personal hygiene 
items," "a dresser," "kitchen table and chairs and some boxes," from his marital residence 
to an upstairs condominium on Ft. Union Blvd. Dan TT 3:18-25, 4:1-3, 36:9-15, Jake TT 
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24:8-10, 29:8-10. Second, the kitchen chair that caused the accident was Dan's property. 
Third, although neither Jake nor Dan knew who loaded the chair, nor what was packed in 
the other's truck, Dan, "helped load both of [the 'two trucks . . . backed up to the 
residence's porch']," and he also helped, "secure the property in the vehicles," by, "just 
throwing ropes back and forth and hooking them in the eye hooks." TT 20:15-16; 21:8-
12, 23-24; 39:21-22; Dan TT 23: 12-19. Fourth, the chair's fall evinces a negligent 
attempt to secure it. And lastly, as shown below, the evidence suggests that Dan drove 
the truck from which the chair fell. 
Based hereon, Dan had a duty to secure his chair. He failed to do this. Dan did 
not secure with tarps nor inspect the loads. TT 7:19-25, 8: 1,7-16, 9:6-14. In fact, the 
chair fell, "probably [because it] got missed when the ropes were getting looped through 
everything [by the McNeils]." Jake TT 19:1-20. 
Defendant minimized the significance of this evidence, arguing: 
. . . [Plaintiff] was able to point to only a single bit of testimony, indicating 
that . . . Mr. McNeil did not inspect the loads to see if they were secure, 
[and that] he had participated in "throwing some ropes" back and forth 
across two of the trucks. Clearly, this one act would not support the 
existence of a duty, because the testimony itself is so vague, and there was 
no follow-up. There is no indication when the event occurred, what stage 
the packing was in, what had gone on before, or what went on after. 
Similarly, there is no mention of attempting to secure the chair that came 
loose . . . App'ee Brief p. 17 
Aside from the fact that this was not "one act" but a series of interrelated acts and 
decisions orchestrated by Dan, the law does not require a second by second freeze-frame 
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replication of events to allow an inference to be drawn therefrom. Dan's "'single" and 
conclusive statement that he helped to load both of trucks and helped, "secure the 
property in the vehicles," by, "just throwing ropes back and forth and hooking them in the 
eye hooks," is sufficiently tendentious so that reasonable minds could conclude that the 
chair fell upon the highway because Dan missed securing it, "when the ropes were getting 
looped through everything,"and he was therefore negligent. Jake TT 19:1-20. 
Dan suggests that, since UCA 72-7-409(9) imposes criminal liability upon drivers 
of vehicles who fail to secure their loads, it forecloses the possibility that Dan, who 
allegedly was not the driver in this case and who only assisted in loading and securing his 
kitchen chair, could have a duty to the Plaintiff. To support this argument, Dan cited 
Ganno v. Langano Corp., 80 P.3d 180, 184 119 Wash. App. 310, (Wash.App. 2d 2004). 
In Ganno, the plaintiff, Mr. Ganno, went to the Defendant, Lumbermen's store and 
purchased a heavy 12-foot beam. In so doing, Ganno had to drive by a lumberyard sign 
stating it was Lumbermen's policy not to secure customer loads. Then a Lumbermen 
employee, using a forklift, placed the beam in Ganno's open truck bed. Due to its 
dimensions, the beam protruded four feet behind it. The employee asked Ganno if he 
wanted the beam flagged. Ganno said "yes," and the employee flagged it. The employee 
did not secure the beam for Ganno and he drove off with the unsecured, heavy beam 
protruding from the truck bed. As he turned a corner, the beam fell off the truck into the 
road. As Ganno attempted to retrieve it, another motorist hit it, causing the beam to 
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shatter Ganno's kneecap. Ganno sued Lumberman for negligence. 
Under various theories of liability, including premise liability, the voluntary rescue 
doctrine, commercial risk of loss and comparative negligence, the Washington court heic 
that Mr. Ganno had not shown the lumber company had a duty toward him, stating: 
Where the seller is a merchant, the risk of loss passes to the buyer on receipt of 
goods. Accordingly, Lumbermen's duty of care ended when it placed the beam 
into Ganno's truck bed . . . In the absence of a legal duty to secure a customer's 
load, as here, there is no liability to a customer once he is in possession of the 
goods . . . The risk of loss passed to Ganno when Lumbermen's loaded the beam 
into his truck. Id, atZM. 
Although the defendant in Ganno, loaded the plaintiffs vehicle, the factual 
similarity to this case ends there. In Ganno, after the beam was delivered to its customer 
defendant had no continued property interest in insuring that the beam arrived safely at its 
destination. Here, unlike Ganno, Dan directed, supervised and assisted in the loading. 
securing and transportation of his own property in which the risk of loss, because he was 
not a merchant, was retained by him during the entire process. Furthermore, while a 
violation of a safety law is evidence of negligence, it does not preclude a finding thai Dan 
had a duty to Plaintiff. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425 (Utah 1998). To determine if a 
dutv exists, in Nomwndean v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 215 P.3d 152. 154 (Utah 2009) 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law w ill 
give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward 
another. A court determines whether a duty exists by analyzing the legal 
relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of 
injury, public policy as to which party can best bear the loss occasioned by the 
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injury, and other general policy considerations . . . Foreseeability as a factor in 
determining duty does not relate to the specifics of the alleged tortious conduct but 
rather to the general relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and the victim. 
"Whether a harm was foreseeable in the context of determining duty depends on 
the general foreseeability of such harm, not whether the specific mechanism of 
the harm could be foreseen." (Citations omitted). 
Also regarding duties, in Ams Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 
942 P.2d 315, 320-321 (Utah 1997) the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"'Whether the law imposes a duty does not depend upon foreseeability alone. The 
. . . magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the consequences of 
placing that burden upon defendant, must also be taken into account.'" A duty 
may also be found on the basis of reasonable mutual reliance, voluntary 
conduct which increases the risk of harm . . . (Citations omitted). 
Many states, determine whether a defendant owes or assumes a duty of care to a 
particular plaintiff by considering public policy. Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 
329 (Term. 2003). Public policy considerations are relevant because "the imposition of a 
legal duty reflects society's contemporary policies and social requirements concerning the 
right of individuals and the general public to be protected from another's act or conduct." 
Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1993). 
There is a great danger to the public when private parties and businesses 
haphazardly transport property in overloaded trucks. Dan made the arrangements to have 
his personal property transported by either inviting or hiring those moving the property. 
Dan instructed those assisting in the move what to take and where to take the property. 
Dan benefitted by the transportation of his property. Dan's personal property caused the 
accident and Dan had the greatest interest in ensuring that the property arrived safe and 
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undamaged at its final destination. Dan's actions and omissions created a great 
foreseeable risk to all commuters on the freeway and to the Plaintiff. To require 
individuals like Dan to transport their personal property in a manner that protects the 
public's well-being is a relatively light burden, in view of the grave consequences that 
result when this is done improperly, is sound public policy. 
B. The Retained Control Doctrine 
Plaintiff argues that the principles discussed in Magana v. DRC, & ABM Crane 
Rental, 2009 UT 45, No. 2008629 (Utah 2009) further establish Dan's liability to her. 
Pursuant to those principles, Plaintiff asserts that Dan's involvement in the loading and 
securing of his personal property established a duty to the Plaintiff irrespective of whether 
or not he was the driver of the vehicle from which the chair fell. 
In rebuttal thereto, Defendant asserts: 
. . . In Magana the case for direct liability . . . was based upon the fact that the 
defendant participated in the very act that caused Mr. Magana (sic) injury. . . 
[Ljiability . . . was [imposed because] . . . the defendant's foreman was seen 
actively involved in securing the very load of trusses that came loose and 
caused the plaintiff to suffer injuries . . . Here, unlike the facts in Magana, no 
one was able to say who loaded the chair at issue . . . App'ee Brief p. 18, 19. 
(Citations to the record omitted). 
Contrarily, Dan "was seen actively involved in securing the very load" of his 
personal property, including the kitchen chair from which the chair, "came loose and 
caused the plaintiff to suffer injuries." Just as in Mangana, it was irrelevant who 
loaded the individual trusses, it is irrelevant that "no one was able to say who loaded the 
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chair at issue . . . " Defendant further erroneously argues: 
. . . [T]here was no testimony about who individually secured the vehicle's load or 
looked over the contents. App'ee Brief p. 19. 
Dan and his son Jake did this in tandem by, "just throwing ropes back and forth 
and hooking them in the eye hooks." TT 20:15-16; 21:8-12, 23-24; 39:21-22. Therefore, 
Dan's own argument establishes that Mangana 's principles apply to him. 
C. New Evidence at Trial Indicating Dan Drove the Subject Vehicle 
Lastly, as argued below, Dan presented evidence at trial that proved he drove the 
vehicle from which the chair fell. 
II. DAN PERSONALLY EMPLOYED JAKE 
The Defendant repeatedly asserted in his brief that: 
There was no evidence presented at trial that would support a finding that Jake 
McNeil was employed by his father, Dan McNeil. . . App'ee Brief p. 7, 8, 9. 
. . . [T]he defendant did not assert that Jake . . . [was an] independent contractor; 
rather, he asserted that [he was] employed by someone other than him 
(personally). . . . App'ee Brief p. 18 
Dan hereby concedes that Jake was "employed by someone" (just not Dan 
personally) to move his personal property. Therefore, any suggestion that Jake was not 
acting as an agent/employee are moot, the only issue is-who hired Jake? Dan suggests 
that if Jake received a D&K paycheck, he was, ipso facto, employed by D&K. No legal 
authority supports this proposition. Dan, as one of two owners of D&K, used company 
resources and assets for a private matter. Defendant erroneously claims that: 
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[A] 11 of the evidence pointed to the conclusion that Jake was employed by D&K 
. . . and that the move itself was a corporate activity . . . App'ee Brief p. 9, 10. 
Dan testified that his son, Jake, his daughter and somebody else assisted in the 
move. Dan TT 3:15-17. The move was not driven by any business need but was due to 
"the last deal with [Dan] and [his] wife, which included . . . some of his 'personal stuff 
. . . ' " Dan TT 3:18-21. Dan moved his personal belongings from the Bluffdale residence, 
including his "clothing" and "personal hygiene items," "some kitchen chairs," "a dresser 
. . ., [and] some boxes . . . " Dan TT 36: 9-15; Jake TT 7:10-25, 8:14-20, 9:11-24. Dan, 
however, did not move from the Bluffdale residence, "boxes of tax returns, 
miscellaneous stuff, tools, all [his] office, because [he] was still using the office." Dan 
TT 36:23-25; 37:1. Dan recalls paying his son some, "gas money or something." Dan 
acknowledged at trial that in his deposition, he had testified that he had not given his son 
a check. Dan TT 8:2-6, 9:15-19, 10:12-15. One chair, belonging to Dan, of a kitchen set, 
caused the accident. This testimony indicates that the move was for Dan's personal 
purposes. 
Additionally, despite Jake's assertion that he received a D&K payroll check for 
moving Dan's personal property, Jake was not working for D&K at that time. Moreover, 
Jake was not performing the duties that in the past he had done for D&K. Jake TT 
3:15-25, 4:1-17; Dan TT 3:22-25, 4:1-3. Furthermore, Dan presented no evidence that 
D&K paid Jake as an employee. Despite this, Dan further argued that he could not be 
liable for Jake's actions because: 
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. . .[Utah] has long rejected the family purpose doctrine, Conklin v. Walsh, 193 
P.2d 437, 440 (Utah 1948).. . Rather, the . . .question . . . is whether the purported 
principal had the right to control the agent during the trip. Fox v. Lavender, 56 
P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah 1936).. . App'ee Brief p. 13. 
Defendant then misleadingly asserts llial Jake was iii-l l);m\ aj'enl because 
. . . Here, all of the evidence shows that Jake was driving his own vehicle at the 
time of the accident and that he was fully in control of that vehicle, and operating 
without instruction or supervision from Dan . . . App'ee Brief r : 4. 
This case's facts bear no relationship to any situation in which one iamm member 
runs ai I ei rai id for ai iotl lei Dai i coi icedes that Jake 1 lad been 1 lit eel to mov e 1 lis property. 
Whether or not Jake worked for Dan personally or D&K through Dan, Dan had the right 
to control Jake. "It is not the actual exercise of control that determines whether an 
employer-employee relationship exists; it is the right to contr* / ,:..-...•: .:;ni.rive." 
Hinds v. Her in Hughes & Sons, Inc., 57 / •• : 36 I ^uiah i97S). iin> : •- rt, mere fore, 
does not require Dan to tell Jake which route to take, which lane to drive in and whether 
to obey the speed limit. It is enough that he had the "right" to do this. Moreover, he did 
"control" . i' '' "i1:'-: * r r )ervised" 'M "; • directed Jake to go from 
point A, the marital residence, to point B, his new residence on Fort Union Boulevard. 
This is sufficient. Most employers do not tell their employees which route to take and 
"how" to drive during simple conn nutes they reasoi lably assui ne tl leir ei nployees will 
take the most direct route and will obey the traffic laws. 
JAKE MCNEIL SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADDED AS A PARTY - A. The 
Discovery Rule Tolled the Statute of Limitations 
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In response to the facts supporting Plaintiffs motion to amend pursuant to the 
discovery rule, Dan made the following inaccurate and misplaced statements: 
. . . First, while the appellant has been quick to assume that Mr. McNeil committed 
some malfeasance, the evidence does not support that claim... App'ee Brief p. 
25. 
. . . "[A | defendant who causes a delay in bringing a cause of action is estopped 
from relying on that statute of limitations as a defense to the action." 
Here, . . . the appellant did no t . . . prove that Jake played any part in providing 
inaccurate information . . . And it would be improper to attribute the purported acts 
of his father to the son. App'ee Brief p. 27, 28. 
The Discovery Rule can be applied when, "a reasonably diligent plaintiff may have 
delayed in filing his or her complaint until after the statute of limitations expired," 
because: "a defendant... has concealed his wrongdoing," because of a "defendant's 
fraudulent and deceptive misbehavior," or due to "exceptional circumstances." See, 
Beaver County v. Tax Commission, 2006 P.3d 6, 12 (Utah 2006) and Russell Packard 
Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 P.3d 741 (Utah 2005). Plaintiff, therefore, is not 
constrained to prove Jake committed malfeasance, nor must she support her motion with 
evidence that is admissible in the underlying action, she must only show she reasonably 
delayed in filing her complaint due to, "exceptional circumstances." 
It is uncontested that, due to the police report identifying Dan as the driver of the 
vehicle, Dan's peripatetic lifestyle (whether innocent or otherwise), Dan delaying the 
McNeil depositions, and Dan's equivocal statements in his answer and responses to 
discovery, Plaintiff delayed bringing a cause of action against Jake. In regards thereto, 
10 
Defendant misleadingly states: 
. . . [Officer Roger Lee] revealed that [he] did not know who had filled in the 
accident form, including the information identifying . . . Dan McNeil [as the 
driver]. . . . Clearly, the investigating officer's testimony calls into doubt the 
reliability of the document relied upon by Ms. Ottens to establish "malfeasance" 
on the part of Mr. McNeil, and does nothing to show that Mr. McNeil made any 
misrepresentation. . . . App'ee Brief p. 26. 
This assertion is false, irrelevant and supportive of Plaintiff s position in several 
respects. First, Plaintiffs Motion to Amend was filed on Sept. 26, -.!()(«> I H I (W-1.? ^ 
Officer Lee's depositioi i was i lot taken i u itil ]i ir n ia.1 y 30 , 2007 1 lence, besides not being 
considered by the trial court on Plaintiffs motion to amend, Plaintiff was unaware of the 
police report's inaccuracy until depositions were taken. Moreover, although Officer Lee 
forgot who filled it out, he autl lenticated it as 1:1 le report pei tail lii ig to 1 lis ii ivestigation of 
this accident This has never been dispi iteci ' FR 109-123. 
Second, Misleadingly, Dan asserts: 
. . . Dan McNeil noted that there were at least three different types of handwriting 
in the report, and that while some of them were similar to his own others were not 
. . . [H]e did not recall filling out the form . . . . . . . did not believe he had filled out 
the form, and . . . he "definitely did not fill out that I was the driver of the vehicle." 
(Citations to the Record Omitted.) App'ee Brief p. 26, 27. 
Dan nevertheless verified that the police report contained the following notes 
written in hai ldwriting similar to his: "RegisU ; red Owm ?/-, D&K F Vm sh Carpentry;'" Dan's 
marital address, "15400 Pony Express Road, Utah, 84065'"' Dan's phone number, "801-
835-8915;" the driver's name, "Dan McNeil;" DmJs birth date, "11-29-55;" Dan?s age, 
"46;" D a n \ s years of dr iv ing exper ience . "Twenty-nine" mid the FnnI (me Is (VOID w h i c h 
11 
the chair fell," 1996 Ford blue-green pickup truck." Dan TT 15:4-25, 16:1-12; 17-19; 
20:1-19; TR 922. Therefore, a jury could conclude that he did fill these portions out. 
Third, as it relates to her motion to amend, the report is not hearsay. Plaintiff did 
not submit the report to prove Dan was the driver for the truth of the matter stated therein, 
but to show why she named Dan as the driver in her complaint. 
Fourth, Dan acted deceptively. Defendant has erroneously argued: 
. . . [BJefore the statute of limitations had expired, Dan . . . put Ms. Ottens on 
notice that Jake • . . was the driver . . . App'ee Brief p. 28. 
To the contrary, in Dan's answer, received by Plaintiff on March 27, 2006 (two 
days before the expiration of the Statute of Limitations), Dan averred that Jake "may 
have been operating," the truck when Dan's kitchen chair fell out. TR 63, 69-70. Then, 
in his initial disclosures, Dan stated that his son, Jake, "may have been driving the pick-
up truck." TR 82, 185-186. Following that on May 2, 2006, in his answer to Plaintiffs 
first discovery request, Dan indicated, "on information and belief," that his son, Jake, 
was the driver of the vehicle. TR 79, 92, 190-192. Given Dan's current position and 
testimony at trial that Jake was unquestionably the driver of the truck from which the 
chair fell, it was unforgivably misleading for Dan to have represented that, Jake may 
have been or "on information and belief was the driver. Dan could have categorically 
stated at the onset that Jake was the driver. Therefore, Dan did not put Ms. Ottens on 
notice that Jake was the driver of the truck. Defendant further erroneously argues: 
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. . . Both [McNeils] testified that on the day of the move, Dan was primarily inside 
the home supervising the loading of boxes, and was not present when Jake 
departed. At any ra te , . . .only a few days before the statute ran, Ms. Ottens was 
aware of two important facts. F i rs t , . . . Dan was not the operator of the Ford pick-
up. Second, she knew the name of the likely driver. Yet, armed with these facts, 
she did nothing. . , . (Citations to the record omitted) App'ee Brief p. 29. 
II • irrelevai it what the McNeils testified to at their depositions. Dan's equivocation 
caused Plaintiffs counsel to hesitate to add Jake as a party. Once Ms. Ottens was 
"armed" with the more conclusive information from the McNeils' depositions, she 
immediately song! it to add fake as a pai i:y 
B. Is There an Identity of Interest Between Dan and Jake? 
Plaintiff asserts that Jake had an identity of interest with Dan. In his response to 
this argument, Defendant incorrectly stated: 
[In its analysis of] . . . Nunez v. Albo 2002 U I App 247, 53 P.3d 2 ... [ I his 
Court] noted, . . . that the new party acknowledged the employee-employer 
relationship,. . that the employee had been working within the course and scope of 
his employment, and that the employer had provided a defense for the employee 
from the outset of the case . . . Appellee Brief p. 22. 
In Xitne:\ 1 h Aibu was \\w original flofeiidanf ll \\d\ I V Uho \i ho asserted in a 
motion for summary judgment, that he was immune from personal liability because he is 
an employee of the University, his treatment of Ms. Nunez had been in the scope of his 
employment, and 1:1 lat the I Jniversity 1 tad pi o vaxieel 1: lis defei lse h i • V um • ::, t! le plaintiff 
sought to add the University of Utah Medical School (University) as a new party. The 
University did not acknowledge the employment relationship between the parties. Nunez 
v. Albo, 53 P.3d 2, 6 (I Jtal i Ct. App. 2002). Similarly, Dai i, the original Defendant, 
13 
concedes that Jake was working as an employee at the time of the move, but was 
conducting D&K's business when the accident occurred. Given that Dan was one of two 
owners of D&K, Dan thereby acknowledges that there was an identity of interest between 
him and Jake-just as there was between Dr. Albo and the University in Nunez. 
Arguing that the McNeils' opposing positions vitiate the finding of an identity of 
interest, Defendant asserts: 
. . . Dan McNeil's defenses . . . were that he was neither the driver of the vehicle 
. . . , nor the employer of his son . . . In contrast, Jake's defense, like that of the son 
in Penrose, [was that] . . . the statutory period had run. App'ee Brief p. 23. 
This is not a difference that the Court indicated would avert a finding that there 
was an identity of interest. Indeed, also in Nunez, the trial court erroneously, "denied Ms. 
Nunez's motion to amend, ruling that she had failed to comply with the express 
provisions of the Immunity Act and that such failure prevented any claims from being 
asserted against the University." In other words, the trial court erroneously determined 
that Ms. Nunez could not sue the University because, due to the passage of time, the 
statutory period had run on the medical malpractice pre-litigation requirements and 
made the same error as the trial court did here. 
IV. DAN'S CORPORATE SHIELD DEFENSE AND PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO 
ADD D&K AS A PARTY DEFENDANT - A. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend at Trial 
At trial, Plaintiff sought to either to strike Dan's Corporate Shield Defense or add 
D&K as a party. TR 1014:4:2. This was done in reaction to Dan asserting the affirmative 
Corporate Shield Defense that if either he or Jake were negligent, they were acting on 
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D&K's behalf. Dan mis-characterizes Plaintiffs Motion to Amend as follows: 
. . . [Plaintiff] moved to amend [her] complaint to add . . . D&K as a party to the 
action,. . . alleging that D&K was an alter-ego of Mr. McNeil, thereby allowing 
[her] to pierce the corporate veil App'ee Brief p. 30, 31. 
One of Ms. Ottens' . . . complaints is that the trial court allowed Mr. McNeil to 
argue that he was not Jake's employer... and to make that point stronger by 
showing that Jake was, in fact, employed by D&K . . . App'ee Brief p 38 
To properly describe Plaintiffs claim against D&K, assume that either Dan, or 
Jake actii tg under Da i f s directioi i,. negligent!} ir caused ii I ji u y to Plaii itiff. A,ssi ime ft other 
Dan's negligent act occurred while acting in the scope of his employment for D&K. 
Consequently, as Defendant indicated, D&K would be the proper party because corporate 
directors, officers and shareholders are protected ft oi i t pei soi lal liability foi causes of 
action arising out of corporate bi isiness because the corporation is a separate entity or 
"person." 
Assume further that Dan and Kim, the only officei s of D&K 1 lad i lot con iplit: d 
with the legal formalities necessary to maintain the "corporate veil." Under these 
circumstances, if the corporation's assets were insufficient to satisfy a claim, the Plaintiff 
could both continue to pursue the corporation and, if the Plaintil f could marshal evidence 
proving that Dan ai id K ii i I treated the coi poi atioi t as tl leiir "alter egc •. " she cot ilci '""pierce 
the corporate veil," and attach Dan's personal assets up to the extent of D&K's liability. 
Plaintiff has never sought to do this. I R 1C 14:4:2,, 44 45 
Nowrassui ne agaii i tl lat eitf ler Dai i, oi lake actii ig I u ider Dai i's directioi i 
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negligently caused injury to Plaintiff. Assume further that either Dan, acting outside the 
scope of D&K's business, engaged in an inappropriate relationship on business premises, 
was using a corporate asset to engage in a wholly private venture unrelated to the business 
entity's business interests, or was simply engaging in personal matters. See D.D.Z. v. 
Molerway Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct.App.1994)) [See Clark v. Pangan, 
998 P.2d 268 (Utah 2000)]. Under any of these factual scenarios, the proper party would 
be Dan-not D&K. 
Assume further that, despite Plaintiffs causes of action against Dan personally, 
during the litigation or at trial, Dan attempted to marshal evidence in his defense 
demonstrating that at the time the negligent act was committed he and/or his agent were 
engaged in D&K's business and therefore they were protected from personal liability by 
D&K's "corporate veil." In the case law this is known as raising the affirmative, 
"Corporate Shield Defense." This is what happened in this case, and is the proper 
characterization thereof. See In Stanwade Metal Products, Inc. v. Heintzelman, 158 Ohio 
App.3d 228, 237 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). Dan further has mis-characterized Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend as follows: 
One of Ms. Ottens' primary complaints is that the trial court allowed Mr. McNeil 
to argue that he was not Jake's employer (and thereby not vicariously liable for his 
negligence), and to make that point stronger by showing that Jake was, in fact, 
employed by D&K . . . App'ee Brief p. 38. 
The record demonstrates that Plaintiff has never made these "complaints." She 
has consistently argued that Dan, acting in his personal capacity (not as an official or 
16 
agent for D&K), hired Jake who was incidentally paid through the D&K payroll. Nor has 
Plaintiff argued either that the McNeils were perfomiing a D&K activity, or that Dan was 
treating D&K as his alter ego, which would have enabled Plaintiff to "pierce the 
corpora to veil/" I)«iti had I he obligation to hutli plead >t(ul I hen pin1* e fhe u\ liimalive, 
"Corporate Shield Defense," or it is lost. He did neither. See Christensen v. Swenson, 
874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994); Zagoria v. Dubose Enterprises, Ine163 Ga. App 880, 
887; Hommel v. Micco, 76 Ohio App 3d 690, 697-698 (1991); Joseph Murat v. F/v 
Shelikof Strait Kodiak, 793 P.?d 69 (Alaska 1 <>90). 
B. The Timeliness of Plaintiffs Defensive Motion to Amend 
In response to Plaintiffs argument to add D&K as a party, Defendant stated: 
In . . . Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 U I App 44, 87 P.3d 734, the 
Court of Appeals . . . stated tha t . . . a proposed amendment is generally deemed 
to be untimely when it is made in the advanced procedural stages of the 
litigation . . . App'ee Brief p. 32 
This is, "generally" true. However, the special circumstances here preponderate 
in Plaintiffs favor Dai i ii iterjected new facts and took new legal positioi is during the 
trial proceedings. Therefore, in fairness to Plaintiff, either Dan's Corporate Shield 
defense should have been stricken, or D&K should have been added as a party. 
Prioi to trial, Dan i ievei i aised the Corporate Shield Defer ise, nor did he eve? i nake 
a URCP Rule 9(i) Designation of Fault against D&K. Contrary to Dan's deposition 
testimony, in which he was asked what he loaded onto his and Jakes' vehicles, and he 
answered, "there w as i iirniture < >i I bol h \ ehicles (Exhil • >it A Dai i "s Dep< > 14:25-25; ;• 
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777 15:1-8),"".. . I mean we had tables, we had chairs, we had book shelves" (TR 777 
16:1-3); at trial, he indicated that in the move he was transporting, ". . . [his] 'office' . . ." 
Dan TT 3:18-21. Also, when Dan was asked at his deposition where he was moving 
from, he said nothing about it being, " . . . [his] 'office' . . ." as he did at trial, but instead 
stated, " . . . that was the house Kim and I lived in (TR 778 22:24-25, 779 23:1-5)." 
Furthermore, in his deposition he consistently referred to the property that was being 
moved as his "personal property," and as "my stuff," not D&K's property. See Exhibit A 
Dan Depo. at 6:21-25, 10:3-10, 13:14-19. 
Jake was asked at his deposition what he moved for his father. Jake only indicated 
he moved a "kitchen table and chairs and some boxes," and did not mention any office 
equipment, nor did he mention the word "office," [Jake TT 8:21-25, 9:1-10], yet at trial, 
Jake testified that he helped his Dad move his office. Jake TT 7:10-25, 8:14-20, 9:11-24. 
At no time during his deposition did Jake indicate that the McNeils were moving Dan's 
D&K Office or office equipment on the day of the accident. Jake TT 28:15-25, 29:1 -10. 
To the contrary, at his deposition Jake stated, " . . . what we were doing was moving [Dan] 
from his house in Bluffdale and he was moving to an apartment.. . (TR 789 8:20-21)." 
Further testimony demonstrated this was a private move. Dan admitted in his 
answer, " . . . that the chair [that fell from the truck] belongfed] to Dan McNeil." Dan TT 
27:3-16; 28:13-16; TR 422-428. Jake testified at trial that he was not working for D&K 
during the move. Jake TT 3:15-25, 4:1-17. Therefore, since Dan changed his legal 
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theory at trail that this was a D&K move, fairness would dictate that either Dan's 
affirmative Corporate Shield Defense should have been stricken, or that Plaintiff should 
have been allowed to add D&K as a party. 
C. The Corporate Shield Defense and Unity of Interest between Dan and D&K 
Dan waived the Corporate Shield Defense. As correctly quoted by Defendant: 
[Pursuant to] Prince v. Bear River. . ., Co., . . . 56 P.3 524, . . . an affirmative 
defense is one which employs matters that are outside of, or are extrinsic to, the 
plaintiffs prima facie case, and which, if proven, will defeat the cause of action 
even if all the allegations in the complaint are true. App'ee Brief p. 39. 
Regarding Prince, Dan, without any analysis, mistakenly states, "Clearly, this is 
not what Mr. McNeil was doing when he identified D&K as Jake's employer." App'ee 
Brief p. 39. To the contrary, if Dan McNeil was identifying D&K as Jake's employer, he 
was identifying himself as the agent that acted on D&K's behalf to hire and supervise 
Jake during the move. Dan concedes that Jake was an employee. In so doing, it is not 
that Dan, "was intending] to prove 'it wasn't me, it was someone else,'" [App'ee Brief p. 
42], but that, "it was me, I was just acting in my official capacity and within the scope of 
my duties as an agent for D&K." Therefore, if "D&K was Jake's employer," Dan hired 
Jake and he is raising the Corporate Shield Defense to defeat Plaintiffs allegation of 
liability against him. 
Moreover, the Corporate Shield Defense is an affirmative defense. This is true 
because "even if all the allegations in [Plaintff s] complaint are true," that Dan 
negligently caused Plaintiffs injury due to his own and his agents' activities," the 
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"extrinsic" factual assertion that the McNeils were acting on D&K's behalf, and are 
therefore protected from personal liability due to the "Corporate Shield," would defeat 
Plaintiffs cause of action. App'ee Brief p. 43 
In her motion to amend, the Plaintiff further alleged that Dan and D&K had a 
"Unity of Interest." In response to this, Defendant alleged: 
. . . The court ultimately concluded that there was insufficient evidence . . . to show 
that D&K and Dan McNeil had an identity of interest.. . App'ee Brief p. 34 
Just as in Nunez, where the court found a unity of interest between University 
employee Dr. Albo and the University, since Dan was one of two owner's of D&K, and 
was acting on D&K's behalf at the time of the move, Dan categorically had a unity of 
interest with D&K. Therefore, Dan's knowledge of the claim can be imputed to D&K, 
and given that Dan raised the Corporate Shield Defense, it would not have violated 
D&K's rights of notice to have allowed a claim against it to proceed. 
D. Rule 9 of the Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure 
In conjunction with her motions to either strike Dan's Corporate Shield Defense or 
to amend, Plaintiff argued that Dan should have named D&K as a non-party pursuant to 
Rule 9(i). In response thereto, Defendant erroneously asserts: 
The . . . rule requires that a party make the designation only if it intends to ask the 
finder of fact to allocate some portion of fault to a non-party. App'ee Brief p. 43. 
• . . [Tjhere was no need to allocate fault to D&K, because its potential liability, as 
an employer, was merely derivative. In other words, if Jake, who was identified 
under Rule 9, was allocated 10% of fault for the accident, then D&K, as Jake's 
employer, would be liable for that very same 10%. Since no additional fault would 
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be allocated to D&K, there was no practical reason to name them under Rule 9. 
App'eeBriefp. 44. 
Pursuant to URCP Rule 9(i), Dan only requested that fault be allocated to Jake in 
his personal capacity and not in his official capacity as an employee for D&K. TR p 426. 
Therefore, since D&K is a separate "person" from the McNeils, Dan's suggestion that 
D&K should be allocated any fault due to his or Jake's actions would have required Dan 
to designate D&K pursuant to URCP Rule 9(i). Second, by asserting that the Corporate 
Shield Defense protected him against any personal liability, any and all liability accessed 
against him for his own actions or against his son as his agent would be imputed to D&K. 
In so doing, Dan was "merely' asking "the finder of fact to allocate some portion of fault 
(his portion) to a non-party"-D&K. Therefore, Dan should not have been allowed to 
argue that D&K be allocated any fault for the McNeils' actions. 
V. DANS CITATION FOR FAILURE TO SECURE HIS LOAD, GUILTY PLEA 
AND PAYMENT OF THE CITATION 
Plaintiff argues that she should have been permitted to show that Dan had been 
issued a citation for failure to secure his load, plead guilty thereto and paid the citation. 
Pursuant to Kealamakia, Inc., v. Kealamakia 2009 UT App 148 f 10, 213 P.3d 13, Dan 
argues that it was incumbent on Plaintiff to "marshal all of the evidence, on both sides of 
the question, to demonstrate the presence of an abuse." App'ee Brief p. 44. The case 
law, including Kealamakia, appear only to apply this obligation to the findings of fact 
supporting judgments in civil cases and criminal convictions, and not to evidentiary 
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rulings. 
Defendant erroneously argued that: 
. . . [T]he relevant pleadings did not make . . . [the] allegation [that Dan drove the 
vehicle from which the chair fell], and the question of who was driving was not at 
issue . . . App'ee Brief p. 45 . . . In his answer, Mr. McNeil admitted that Jake was 
the driver . . . Accordingly, any evidence . . . demonstrating] that Dan was actually 
driving the vehicle was simply not relevant, i.e., it did not tend to prove a fact of 
consequence to the determination of the action. App'ee Brief p. 46. 
Contrarily, it is disputed whether or not Dan is directly liable for causing 
Plaintiffs injuries. Showing that Dan drove the vehicle from which the chair fell would 
tend to prove this issue. In regards hereto, Defendant argues: 
. . . The court . . . held that Ms. Ottens' complaint did not allege that Dan was the 
driver and [was] an effort to change the . . . theory of the case at the last minute . . . 
App'ee Brief p. 2, 3. 
Candidly, the McNeils' deposition testimonies prompted Plaintiff to amend her 
complaint to assert that Jake drove the vehicle. However, new facts introduced by Dan on 
the eve of trial, and during trial, indicated that Dan was the driver. While the formalities 
of litigation are often indispensable to its fairness and efficiency, they should not be so 
inflexible as to allow Dan to use them as a shield prohibiting the Plaintiff to adjust her 
theory of the case while weilding the sword of change in his own defense. 
Just 2 1/2 months before trial, on Sept. 15, 2008, in Dan's response to a motion to 
compel discovery (TR 639) it was stated that, "Counsel recently located his client, Dan 
McNeil, who currently lives in the state of Oregon . . . upon finding the client, . . . 
defendant promptly responded to the discovery . . . " Dan's response then admitted that 
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the police report's handwritten notes identifying him as the driver were similar to his 
handwriting. DanTT 15:4-25, 16:1-12; 17-19; 20:1-19; TR 922. Jake then testified at 
trial that while driving he never changed lanes but, "stayed in the right hand lane, the 
slow lane, the whole way there." Jake TT 26:3-7. However, the Plaintiff established, as 
did the police report, that the chair fell from the truck when it changed from the right lane 
to the center lane, and neither McNeil knew in which truck the falling chair had been 
loaded. TT 23: 12-19, 56:1-19, 152, 922. This new evidence tends to prove that Dan was 
the driver, contrary to the McNeils' position during the litigation. 
Furthermore, according to all the evidence, after the trucks were fully loaded, Jake 
and a companion left before Dan. Approximately 15 minutes to 30 minutes after, Dan 
followed in his loaded vehicle. Then, on his way, Dan testified that he, "got almost 
there," and he, "called Jake on the cell phone, because [Dan] thought [he] recognized one 
of [his] black chairs on the side of the road." Dan TT 11:6-25, 12: 1-23. Dan then said, 
"well, I think one of the chairs fell out on the freeway so I'm going to go back and talk to 
the police officers." Jake TT 12:17-20. Jake also did not see the chair fall from his 
vehicle. Jake TT 19:1-20. The most logical inference that can be drawn from all these 
facts is that Dan saw the chair fall out of his truck when he changed lanes, he saw the 
accident occur and he drove back knowing that the police would be arriving shortly. 
Given this evidence, the trial court should have allowed Plaintiff to introduce evidence 
about Dan's citation, guilty plea and payment of the fine. 
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VL EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF HIRED AN ATTORNEY 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's counsel's intrusion upon her right to consult 
counsel should not have been violated. In response thereto, the Defendant argues: 
. . . During . . . tr ial , . . . Ms. Ottens was asked if she retained (counsel) within two 
months of the accident, and she answered [affirmatively]... [N]o further inquiries 
were made. App'ee Brief p. 47, 48 
. . . [There a r e ] . . . two potential reasons why such evidence might be relevant. 
First, as . . . recognized in the case of Pennington . . ., early attorney involvement 
. . . , and possible counsel initiated referrals to healthcare providers can support an 
inference that medical bills and treatment are inflated or unreasonable. 
Additionally, the defense anticipated that Ms. Ottens would . . . portray Mr. 
McNeil as dishonest with respect to the information . . . in the police report, and 
assert that she was prejudiced [thereby]... The fact that Ms. Ottens retained 
counsel almost immediately after the accident tends to undermine the claim of 
prejudice . . . App'ee Brief p. 48,49. 
Additionally, Defendant argues that: 
. . . [when Ms. Ottens retained counsel] . . . was relevant to . . . show that counsel 
directed treatment... App'ee Brief p. 6, 7. 
A. Counsel Directed Unreasonable or Inflated Medical Treatment 
To allow a jury to draw "an inference that medical bills and treatment are inflated 
or unreasonable," or that "counsel directed treatment" due to early attorney involvement 
is, with all due respect, very imprudent law. Such reasoning has no more validity than to 
allow a jury, due to "early attorney involvement,"to draw inferences that defendants and 
their attorneys fabricate testimony and conspire with witnesses. To allow such inferences 
is an affront to the Plaintiffs' Bar and to the entire legal profession, because it assumes 
that plaintiffs' attorneys are "directing] treatment" and illegally conspiring with treating, 
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professionally-licensed, physicians to provide unnecessary treatment and to inflate 
medical bills. 
To rebut such an inference, a plaintiffs attorney would have to present testimony 
from the client or take the stand himself to indicate whether or not "counsel directed 
treatment," and to what extent. This would intrude on the attorney/client privilege. 
Whether or not "medical bills and treatment are inflated or unreasonable" is a medical 
question that should be addressed by the medical experts only, and not by the courts and 
defense counsels calling upon a jury to speculate about the influences of "early attorney 
involvement." On the onset of any potential legal issue, all parties have a right to "early 
attorney involvement" without fear that the courts will allow opposing counsels to ask the 
jurors to draw negative inferences therefrom. 
B. Early Attorney Involvement on The Issue of Prejudice 
Since the trial court, and not the jury, determined if the misleading Police Report 
reasonably delayed Plaintiff from adding Jake as a party, the fact that Plaintiff "had early 
attorney involvement" was irrelevant to any issue in dispute during the trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully requested that Plaintiffs appeal in all respects be granted. 
DATED: January 27, 2010 
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS GROUP, PC 
^--Eoren M. tamfeert/Attorney for Appellant 
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A No, they live in California now. 
Q Were they present when you were moving from 
that home? 
A No. 
Q Where were they when that was occurring? 
A I have no idea. 
Q When you were living — 
A Excuse me. I'm sorry for interrupting. Are 
you talking about moving my stuff out of Kimfs home? 
Q Let me ask a better question. That's a good 
point. 
Do you recall moving your personal property on 
March 29th, 2002 from 154 — 15400 Bluffdale -- Pony 
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Tell me what vehicles you loaded, if you 
What vehicles I loaded? 
Yes. 
My truck. We both backed up to the porch and 
started — I was telling Jake, okay, we need 
is, and this out of the house. That was my 
Did you load anything into the vehicle that 
driving? 
Oh, probably. 
What kind of a vehicle was the vehicle that 
driving? 
A pickup truck. 
What make and year? 
A Ford. I have no idea what year it was. It 





Do you know what color it was? 
Greenish blue, I believe. 
Do you know who held title to the vehicle? 
As far as I know Kirk Gilger did. ! 
That was something that was between Jake and 
Kirk, not me. 
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Q So if you wrote a check to pay your 
subcontractors, who would write out the check and sign 
it? 
A Well, I would write out — they would pay me 
and I would write out the check if I owed them, whatever 
I owed them. 
Q Do you know if you paid any money for anyone 
to heLp you move your property on March 29th, 2002? 
A You know, I have no idea. I could have or I 
couldn't have. I don't really think that I would have 
given them a check. I probably gave somebody gas money 
or something if anything like that. I mean, I didn't 
pay anybody to — 
Q Who supervised the loading of your personal 
property onto the two pickup trucks that you used that 
day? 
A As far as supervising, what do you mean? As 
far as — we went into the house, I says, Okay, this is 
my stuff, we need this in the trucks. I didn't go to 
each truck and say, Okay, put this here, put that there, 
if that's what you're talking about. I'm not sure. 
Q Correct. So the most you recall doing is 
indicating what needed to be loaded — 
A Correct, out of Kim's house. 
Q Did you supervise the manner in which anything 
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was placed in the truck or wrapped or secured? 
A Probably in the house I probably did. You 
know, if we had breakables or pictures, I probably had 
them put them in a box or something. Thatfs a long time 
to remember back doing something like that. 
Q And do you know who secured any of the items 
in either of the vehicles? 
A Well, I secured mine and we roped everything 
down on both vehicles. I mean, I never went and 
inspected anything, but — I mean, I know that we roped 
everything down on both vehicles. We were doing it 
together. 
Q When you say "we," who are we? 
A Me and Jake. 
Q Do you recall at all if you in any manner 
assisted in roping down or securing any of the items in 
Jake's vehicle? 
A Yeah, we helped rope each vehicle down. 
Q So if I'm understanding your testimony 
correctly, the two of you jointly roped the property in 
both vehicles? 
A Right. Correct. As far as I can remember 
that's how it went. 
Q And tell me, when everything was loaded on the 
vehicles, describe for me the amount of property that 
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